Daniel Dennett

Daniel Dennett is one of the most influential thinkers at the interface between philosophy and science. This book is a comprehensive examination of Dennett´s ideas on the nature of thought, consciousness, free will and the significance of Darwinism.Elton examines Dennett´s unique response to the question of when and how science should affect the conception that we have of ourselves. Whilst rejecting reductionism on the grounds that much of our self-conception is immune to revision, Dennett also rejects the idea that science has nothing to say about our self-conception - an idea that still flourishes within contemporary philosophy. What emerges is a view in which our understanding of ourselves is constrained by, but not continuous with, scientific inquiry. Elton brings out the themes that bind together different aspects of Dennett´s work.At the same time he casts new light on more specific controversies: could robots ever think, feel and enjoy freedom? Does Dennett really explain consciousness? Are mental states real or merely "useful fictions"? Do we have free will? Is the self a "centre of narrative gravity"? Written in a clear and engaging style, the book is an original introduction to contemporary thinking about the relationship between mind and science.